Ummels, Michael and Wojtczak, Dominik - The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

lmcs:1209 - Logical Methods in Computer Science, September 28, 2011, Volume 7, Issue 3
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

Authors: Ummels, Michael and Wojtczak, Dominik

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium of G where Player 0 wins with probability 1? Moreover, this problem remains undecidable when restricted to pure strategies or (pure) strategies with finite memory. One way to obtain a decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability 1 can be done in polynomial time for games where the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities.


Source : oai:arXiv.org:1109.4017
DOI : 10.2168/LMCS-7(3:20)2011
Volume: Volume 7, Issue 3
Published on: September 28, 2011
Submitted on: November 30, 2009
Keywords: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory,Computer Science - Computational Complexity,F.1.2, G.1.6, G.3


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